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    Vol. 13 No. 35                     THE AIR CARGO NEWS THOUGHT LEADER                          Tuesday April 22, 2014

ICAO Nixes Lith-ion Pax 2015

     The ICAO Dangerous Goods Panels (DGP) working group studying Lithium batteries that convened in Montreal from April 7th to 11th has come down with a decision to ban transport of Lithium Metal batteries, shipped aboard passenger carrying aircraft.
     Effective January 1st, 2015 when a new ICAO Biennium will begin and a new edition of the international legal framework for the transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, the “ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air” will go into force now promising a new deal for Lithium batteries.
     The decision of the DGP still requires approval from two ICAO governing bodies, the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) and the ICAO Council.
     While it is expected that both the ANC and the Council will approve the DGP’s decision, one should not take such approval for granted, especially in the light of considerable industry lobbying from organizations such as NEMA (National Electrical Manufacturers Association and PRBA (The Rechargeable Battery Association).


Li-Batteries for Dummies


     There are basically two types of Lithium batteries: Primary (Lithium – Metal) and Secondary (Lithium – Ion). Lithium Polymer batteries are classified Lithium – Ion type.
     These two types must be differentiated since the danger level of each differs greatly. The main issue is that Lithium Metal batteries are considered to be more volatile and that they exhibit a burn temperature of about 1450 degrees Celsius; and that the fire suppressant used aboard aircraft, Halon, has proven ineffective against lithium metal battery fires.
     The two types of batteries, Lithium metal (UN 3090) and Lithium – Ion (UN 3480) each come in three different forms: The batteries as such, batteries packed with equipment and batteries contained in equipment.
     Each battery type has different packaging instructions featuring unique requirements which must be complied with.
     The packaging instructions for batteries included with and contained in equipment are each divided into two parts:
     Part II are small cells or batteries.
     For Lithium Metal batteries, the limit is 1g of aggregate Lithium per cell and 2 g per battery; for Lithium – Ion batteries the threshold is 20 Wh per cell and 100 Wh per battery.
     Currently, small batteries in compliance with the limitations of part II of the applicable packing instruction can be transported without a formal transport document (the “Shipper’s Declaration for Dangerous Goods”), they do not need a specific packaging (although the packaging must have undergone a drop test and a stack test).
     They are exempt from most of the formal DG requirements, including the requirement for formal DG training of the shipper’s staff.
     For the batteries shipped as such, there are actually three parts in the applicable packing instructions, Part IA, Part IB and Part II. When a battery or cell is of the “small” type but the quantity limitations stipulated by the applicable PI are not complied with, these batteries can be shipped under Part IB with a Shipper’s Declaration up to 10kg gross mass per package for Li-Ion batteries and 2.5 kg gross mass for Lithium Metal batteries.
     In this context, it does not help that quantity limitation in parts IA and II are net article weight limitations and for part IB gross mass limitations, owing to some ruckus within the ICAO DGP, the group which approved this decision about one year ago.
     If you feel that this background information is complicated, welcome to the club, but bear in mind that PRBA and NEMA are outspoken advocates of no formal DG training necessary for shippers of the “small” types.

Issue often overlooked

     The main culprit however is that any battery, no matter which type and form – including the small button-type cells in your watch, as well as lithium – Ion battery packs in your electrical bicycle or power drill – must have successfully undergone a test in accordance with part III, subsection 38.3 of the UN manual of Tests and criteria.
     It is the responsibility of any and all shippers to have either the full test certificate or at least a so-called “certificate of conformity” on hand so that, at least theoretically, the conformity of the batteries to be shipped with the so-called “general requirements” can be proven.
     Suffice it to say that such a certificate is mostly unavailable, and even dedicated and compliant shippers will find it hard to impossible to come across the required documentation:
     Very often, manufacturers of equipment that contain Lithium batteries are sourcing identical cells and batteries from different manufacturers and are unable to tell which battery has been installed in which particular device.


What will change?

     The ICAO DGP’s decision, if enacted and approved, will do away with part II of Packing Instruction 968 which covers Lithium Metal batteries and cells.
     As the discussion paper so aptly put it, “continuing to permit their transport on passenger-carrying aircraft, despite the known risks should not be considered an acceptable mitigation strategy.”
     This will only cover the shipment of Lithium metal batteries.
     When installed in or shipped with equipment, Lithium metal batteries will still be permitted on passenger aircraft.
     This means that Lithium Metal batteries will need to be shipped by all-cargo aircraft or by ground – which given the demise of all-cargo operators in some parts of the world and the viability of operating all-cargo aircraft in a market with constantly declining yields may be an issue.

What will come of it?

     Indeed a very valid question is whether shippers might not adopt an avoidance strategy and decide to ship these batteries undeclared (which is actually the greatest risk of all), since for Dangerous Goods not declared as such, there are little, if any, mitigation strategies.
     Subsequently, the ICAO DGP paper while expressing “concern that such ban on the transport of lithium metal batteries (on passenger-carrying aircraft) would increase the risk as it would serve only to stop compliant shipments of batteries and that non-compliant (means: undeclared) shipments would continue and likely increase in number” is of the opinion that “most citizens and organizational entities are known to be law abiding and do not violate restrictions or prohibitions.”
     The latter may be wishful thinking, since the UPS 006 accident could be used to argue otherwise.

Not the End

     The decision of the ICAO DGP, however, even if approved and enacted is hardly the end. The issue of flight UPS 006 came up, we are told, numerous times during the DGP meeting, but was rebuffed because UPS 006 was an all-cargo aircraft. However, the undeclared batteries which most likely started the fire in the UPS 006 cargo hold could have been loaded aboard a passenger aircraft as well. It was sheer luck that they weren’t. Since these goods were not declared as dangerous goods, there was nothing prohibiting their transport aboard a passenger-carrying aircraft.

Test Played Into Decision

     The background scenario for the ICA DGP decision was a multidisciplinary meeting hosted by the FAA’S William J. Hughes Technical Centre from February 4th to February 6th this year. FAA was able to prove that the postulations made as a result of their cargo aircraft fire risk model, which PRBA had called “faulty and flawed” were actually too conservative:
     4,800 lithium-metal 123A cells were loaded in their original shipping cartons into a 727 cargo airliner donated by FedEx. A small alcohol fire was used to start the fire.
               *The fire in the class C lower cargo hold could not be controlled with Halon 1301.
               * The test had to be halted after nine minutes after the fire would have been detected to prevent the loss of the test airframe.
               * After halting the test, an explosion occurred that blew the flight deck door off its hinges, dislodged all of the main deck flooring above (…).
               *The test produced temperatures in the cargo hold which exceeded the certification requirements for cargo liners and caused smoke propagation into the flight deck. Within five minutes of fire detection, the flight deck was fully obscured by smoke (the UPS 006 accident scenario). The low ventilation rate and reduced oxygen concentration had little effect in containing the fire”.
     The aforementioned findings are quoted from the ICAO DGP working paper 1 that states in conclusion:
     “The outcome of the analysis suggested the transport of lithium metal batteries on passenger aircraft posed an unacceptable risk under the existing circumstances, on the basis that the likelihood of an event occurring was remote, but that the severity of the consequence of the event would be catastrophic.”

What’s next?

     ICAO DGP will meet again in November this year, and then the question of how to deal with Lithium metal batteries aboard all-cargo aircraft. Likely, there will be further restrictions and limitations.
     It should be said clearly that there are transport solutions, which can indeed mitigate the risks associated with lithium batteries of any type. For example, the IntuPlas containers of PyroPhobic Systems have proven effective in containing Lithium battery fires – even those of the Lithium metal variety – over a prolonged period of time, so in case service to shipping destination by cargo aircraft is not available, and ground transport proves too slow, there are options, since almost anything may be transported legally with competent authority approval under the conditions laid out by such authority.
     Whatever the course of action, myriads of employees worldwide required to undergo either initial or recurrent DG training will struggle with the annual re-do of the Lithium battery shipping requirements, and so will the shippers.
Jens


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