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  lying is the safest means of transport as proven by accident statistics, 
        and that is what regulators and other stakeholders continuously emphasize, 
        for a reason. Indeed, chances are much higher to get run over in your supermarket’s 
        parking lot than to be involved in an aircraft accident, even for those 
        road warriors constantly travelling for business.
 However, there are exceptions to this rule.
 The “IATA 2012 Safety Performance 
        Statistics” indicate an all-time low of 0.20 hull losses (which 
        is the euphemism for an aircraft totally wrecked) per million sectors 
        for the airline industry in total.
 A “sector”, for those not familiar 
        with the term, is a flight segment uninterrupted by landings from point 
        A to point B. A flight from, say, Frankfurt to Los Angeles via New York 
        would hence comprise of two sectors. But there is more.
 
 
   The IATA statistics (for good reason) are 
        listing only western-built aircraft, so they’re not all encompassing.
 The simple reason for this is that would 
        these statistics have included accidents involving Russian-built aircraft, 
        a much less favorable picture would appear.
 Still, the statistics prove that flying 
        in the U.S., Europe, and most parts of Asia has never been safer than 
        at present.
 
 
   The numbers also prove that the safety map 
        has two blind spots: Africa and the CIS States.
 There is a multitude of reasons for the 
        lapse; the most important being lack of oversight by national authorities 
        in some states; cash-strapped carriers operating old, obsolete, and badly 
        maintained aircraft; the lack of a safety culture; and lack of training 
        in all sectors of the aviation business.
 Indeed, a number of airlines from African 
        and CIS states are on the EC “No Fly” list because the governments 
        tasked with their oversight do not have the necessary means at their disposal.
 It is safe to say that all stakeholders 
        in the aviation business have addressed these issues in the past 10 years 
        (namely ICAO and IATA) and brought forward a number of safety initiatives 
        that aim at improving safety records in these parts of the world.
 It must be kept in mind that the International 
        Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), headquartered in Montreal, is a United 
        Nations Agency and thus counts the governments involved among their stakeholders.
 
 
   Subsequently, it is all the more surprising 
        to look at the unusually high number of accidents and incidents involving 
        UN-chartered aircraft.
 As much as the UN, ICAO, and other stakeholders 
        call for exchange of information as a best business practice, information 
        is not easily obtained concerning UN chartered aircraft.
 First of all, just looking at a list of 
        accidents involving such UN charters will tell little. Yes, the figure 
        is high, but it must also be kept in mind that many of these flights are 
        operated under very adverse conditions, often in war-stricken areas or 
        after the occurrence of natural disasters.
 Second, those flights often operate to remote 
        areas where neither paved runways nor appropriate ground equipment exist. 
        Western-built aircraft, in particular the cargo versions, have to rely 
        on both in order to operate, while the sturdier Russian-built aircraft 
        designed with a multi-purpose civil and military use require very little 
        ground equipment and can operate on gravel strips.
 Given those adverse conditions and the remote 
        locations, a higher accident rate than flights operating between well-equipped 
        western airports seems reasonable—to a degree.
 But even when factoring in these circumstances, 
        the accident rate involving UN-chartered aircraft remains unusually high.
 As for incidents (happenings which had the 
        potential to endanger aircraft, crew, passengers, other people or property, 
        and cargo, but fortunately did not result in any of these) there is simply 
        no way of ascertaining these, since neither the UN nor the governments 
        involved provide any insight.
 It is, however, safe to say that certain 
        safety precautions required by ICAO and theoretically demanded by the 
        UN by means of charter contracts are usually not implemented and that 
        typically neither the UN or UN Mission in question nor the operator has 
        sufficient operational control to guarantee a safety level as equivalent 
        to ICAO SARPS (Standards and Recommended Practices) as circumstances would 
        allow.
 
 
   A telling posting in a professional pilot’s 
        forum reads:
 “There are two ways to get a UN contract. 
        One is to broker cheap unsafe ex eastern bloc military aircraft or bribe.
 “Any combination of the above is also 
        acceptable.
 “Sometimes you don’t even need 
        to have the aircraft—just say you do.”
 While this statement may be overrated, exaggerated, 
        or simply untrue, it is still telling; at least it was not challenged 
        in any way from other pilots in that forum.
 
 
   The following facts have been established 
        in regard to UN charters:
 
  Russian-built and partially technically obsolete aircraft such as 
        the AN12, AN 24, AN70; Ilyushin IL62, older IL76 types, and IL-86 as well 
        as Yakovlev YAK-40 and old western Boeing 727’s with questionable 
        or no maintenance records are frequently in use, although these aircraft’s 
        maintenance and registration records often do not hold up to even a cursory 
        check. 
  UN and UN mission’s personnel (including sub organizations 
        such as the WFP) have not been briefed about elementary security and safety 
        measures such as carriage of Dangerous Goods within baggage, aircraft 
        emergency exits, etc. 
  Aircraft crews are sometimes not properly licensed and at times 
        filed flight plans make it obvious that crew duty times were exceeded 
        on a scheduled basis. 
  UN missions at times resort to questionable measures, such as proposing 
        to airlift UXO (unexploded ordnance) from a crisis area, notwithstanding 
        clear provisions in the UN’s own “UN Landmine Handbook” 
  The prime criterion when selecting an operator seems to be the tender 
        price. Safety records of the operator and the ability to exercise the 
        required operational control (thus meeting applicable ICAO minimum safety 
        standards to which the UN at least verbally commits itself) are apparently 
        not taken all too much into consideration 
  The reputation of an operator also does not seem to play a big role—various 
        UN missions had contracted Kazakhstan-registered Irbis Air, owned by alleged 
        arms dealer “Lord of War” Viktor Anatolyevich Bout, to supply 
        airlift capacity, resulting in Bout profiting both from the supply of 
        arms into war areas such as Liberia and Angola and from the relief mission 
        supply following it. Maintaining the aforementioned “operational 
        control” is far more important than it might seem.
 
 
   One factor that played a vital role in at 
        least two accidents involving UN-chartered aircraft was inaccurate trim 
        (weight and balance) and/or overweight of the aircraft resulting from 
        inaccurate establishment of the loaded cargoes’ actual gross weight, 
        and/or the crew accepting bribes to carry undocumented, private, or commercial 
        cargoes of unknown nature, according to a source close to the matter who 
        wishes to remain unnamed.
 However, the July 8th, 2011, crash of Hewa 
        Bora Airlines flight 952 (which was not in any way affiliated with the 
        UN or one of its missions) in Kisangani, DRC, might serve as an example 
        of what to expect.
 The accident aircraft, an ex-Lufthansa 727-30, 
        had no maintenance records to speak of, both the accident captain and 
        the tower controller turned out not to have been licensed, the tower communication 
        was not recorded since both recorders were broken, and the tower gave 
        out a false weather report; altogether it resulted in the loss of 75 lives.
 The carriage of “undocumented” 
        passengers aboard aircraft in Africa is also an issue for flights under 
        UN charter, the source confirmed – either because the mostly African-based 
        and underpaid crew was paid to turn a blind eye, or because people hide 
        in the cargo holds.
 It is also safe to say that the UN and its 
        missions apparently do not carry out the bare minimum of “due diligence” 
        regarding the service providers of air transport capacity, which would 
        be expected from any privately held company:
 An Airzena Georgian Airways CRJ-100, registration 
        4L-GAE, which was under charter for the UN as flight 834 from Kisangani 
        to Kinshasa N'Djili, DRC, crashed after a missed approach in Kinshasa, 
        resulting in the death of all four crew and 28 of the total 29 passengers 
        in UN employ on April 4th, 2011.
 On November 18th, 2010, however, the CAA 
        of Georgia communicated the following brief to all civil aviation authorities 
        worldwide.
         
          | “Dear Colleagues, 
 Georgian registered CL-600-2B19 Reg:4L-GAE 
            operated in Republic of Congo by A/C ‘Georgian Airways’ 
            flight operation has been prohibited from 18.11.2010 due to suspension 
            of certificate of airworthiness. Please inform relevant Aviation Authorities 
            to ground above-mentioned aircraft until additional official permission 
            from the United Transport Administration of Georgia.
 
 Shalva Kiknadze, Head of Flight Standards, Certification and Inspection 
            Division"
 
 |    Given the risky circumstances of such operations, 
        it would seem wise for certain safety precautions to be taken from the 
        UN side. These, however, amount to not much more than limiting the liability 
        of the UN towards the operator to $100,000 USD, subparagraph 3.1 of the 
        UN standard short-term charter agreement reads:
 “3.1 In consideration of the complete and satisfactory provision 
        by the Carrier of all of the services under this Agreement, the UN shall 
        pay the Carrier the sums, in the manner and at the times, provided for 
        in the Payment Schedule set forth in Annex B, hereto. The foregoing notwithstanding, 
        in no event shall the UN pay the Carrier for all the services to be provided 
        hereunder a total price in excess of US DOLLARS -- HUNDRED THOUSAND HUNDRED 
        AND (US$ --), which shall constitute the maximum monetary liability of 
        the UN to the Carrier under this Agreement.
 Help, so it seems, is expensive, but covering 
        the risks of help in developing nations comes cheap.
 Jens
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