o, this is not a story about Boeing’s B787, although for all the public knows, the recent grounding of the fledgling fleet of new generation aircraft due to suspected fires has brought an almost razor sharp focus to the lithium power source.
But a look at lithium batteries reveals they were an issue long before the B787, in fact they have been controversial, heavily under discussion, and subject to scrutiny by regulators and other stakeholders for more than a decade.
     Since 2008, the regulatory requirements applicable to this commodity have changed considerably in all modes of transport, but the changes in the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations especially have substantially complicated and become an issue in dangerous goods training for shippers, forwarders, and operators.

    On July 24th, 2013, the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA), in cooperation with the U.S. NTSB, FAA, and representatives from Boeing and GE, released an exhaustive, compelling, and overwhelming final accident report for UPS Flight 006.
    By way of background, on a flight from Dubai International Airport to Cologne Bonn Airport on September 3, 2010, UPS Flight 6, a UPS Boeing 747-400F, registration N571UP, crashed near the Dubai Silicon Oasis at approximately 7:45pm local time after declaring an emergency fifty minutes after takeoff.
    Both crew members were killed, the first such casualties in UPS's history.
    The report clearly mentions that the accident source was a Lithium battery fire in the forward main deck of the UPS 744 freighter, and that the post-crash investigation clearly identified Lithium batteries in the cargo that were subject to declaration requirements; however, according to UPS loading information, no declared dangerous goods were on board.
    Given the nature of the cargo—among it cell phones, toys, consumer electronics, and the like— it is doubtful that these undeclared dangerous goods shipments could not have been identified given additional scrutiny, especially for a flight from the heart of battery production in Asia to Europe.
    As outlined in the exhaustive accident report, “the accident aircraft impacted the ground inside the confines of Nad Al Sheba military base nine nautical miles south of Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
    “During the impact, the aircraft destroyed an unknown number of buildings and trucks,” and just sheer luck prevented the aircraft from crashing into densely populated areas; the aircraft’s Captain was incapacitated due to a lack of oxygen, which was a result of malfunctions caused by the cargo fire, and the Copilot flying the aircraft could neither see his instruments nor the ground because of smoke in the cockpit.
    The report goes on to say that “as detailed in other sections of this report, a cargo fire originating on the main cargo deck breached the cargo compartment liner, severely damaging the control cable support trusses, oxygen system, and other essential systems, impairing the ability of the crew to safely operate the aircraft for the duration of the flight from the time of the first fire indication.
    “Due to the cargo compartment liner failing to operate as an effective fire and smoke barrier, the supernumerary and cockpit areas filled with continuous smoke.
    “The smoke did not abate for the duration of the emergency.”
    Although the GCAA is careful in making general statements, they admit that “to date, the hazard posed by lithium and lithium-ion batteries has not been fully understood and quantified by the fire protection community”—a possible wake-up call for the stakeholders involved.
    The report goes on to highlight the findings through testing conducted by the FAA Tech Center, which indicated that “there are particular propagation characteristics associated with lithium batteries.
    Overheating has the potential to create thermal runaway, a chain reaction leading to self-heating and release of a battery’s stored energy.
    In a fire situation, the air temperature in a cargo compartment fire may be above the auto-ignition temperature of lithium.
    “For this reason, batteries that are not involved in an initial fire may ignite and propagate, creating a risk of a catastrophic event.
    “The existence and magnitude of the risk will depend on such factors as the total number and type of batteries on board an aircraft, the batteries’ proximity to one another, and existing risk mitigation measures in place, which can include the type of fire suppression system on an aircraft, appropriate packaging, and stowage of batteries.”
    It is concluded that “Class D fires are a chemical reaction which is self-sustaining. Battery fires are electric fires, to extinguish the fire the short must be removed and the temperature reduced as the short is internal to the cell during a thermal runaway, the thermal runaway has to be stopped to contain the fire hazard.
    “Uncontained, the battery discharge can spread to adjacent cells, establishing a chain reaction.
    “The explosive potential of lithium metal cells can easily damage (and potentially perforate) cargo liners, or activate the pressure relief panels in a cargo compartment. Either of these circumstances can potentially lead to a loss of Halon 1301 [in class C cargo compartments], allowing rapid fire spread within a cargo compartment to other flammable materials.
    “For this reason, lithium metal cells are currently prohibited as bulk cargo shipments on passenger-carrying aircraft.” (Note from the Editor: The prohibition of transporting Lithium-metal batteries aboard passenger-carrying aircraft is stipulated in 49 CFR and applies only for transports to, from, or through the U.S. and aboard U.S.-registered aircraft worldwide; generally the ICAO TI and the IATA DGR permit the carriage of lithium-metal batteries aboard passenger-carrying aircraft elsewhere).
    The UAE GCAA issued the following recommendations with the final accident report for UPS flight 006:
              Enhanced crew member training and emergency checklists
              Enhanced customer and employee training on dangerous goods
              FAA certification for an in-container fire suppression system
              calling for harmonization of domestic and international shipping



    Since Lithium metal battery fires cannot be suppressed by means of the fire suppressant gas Halon used aboard aircraft, and given the highly volatile nature of certain batteries, one would wish the voice of IFALPA, the pilots’ interest group, would be heard.
    IFALPA’s and ALPA’s input was instrumental to U.S. DOT – PHMSA’s (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration) NPRM HM-224F which, if adopted, would have imposed much stricter regulations on the transport of Lithium batteries at least to, from, and through the U.S. as well as aboard US-registered aircraft operating elsewhere.
    However, the Obama administration directed PHMSA and FAA not to implement stricter rules on the transport of Lithium batteries, owing to pressure from PRBA (The Rechargeable Battery Association), other lobby groups, and the overall fear that such unilateral measure might hurt U.S. trade.
    It is understandable that the pilots flying the aircraft have a very valid interest to protect the life and health of their passengers as well as their own, and things tend to look different when seen through a cockpit window versus some office in Washington, D.C. What might be useful in all of this is if other special interest groups are given equal voice to PRBA which, despite extensive research into the risks of shipping Lithium batteries undertaken by the U.S. FAA, the UK CAA, and the Transport Canada (Freighter Airplane Cargo Fire Risk, Benefit and Cost Model), still calls for further relaxation of lithium battery-related regulations.

    It actually depends on the type of the battery. Primary batteries, also called Lithium-metal, are typically the non-rechargeable type frequently found in button cells, camera batteries, and the like; secondary batteries, also called Lithium-ion or Lithium-polymer, are rechargeable and found in laptops, cellphone, cordless power drills and a multitude of other equipment.
    More often than not, equipment may contain both types of batteries.

    First of all, many of the modern wonders of technology contain these battery types.
    Depending on type and size they are more or less subject to regulatory requirements, and many consumers as well as retailers are either not aware of these regulatory requirements or fail to comply for a multitude of reasons.
    The situation is not helped by the fact that legal requirements in this matter contradict other laws aiming at consumer protection, for example:
    Let’s assume that you ordered a laptop in an online store.
    This purchase will typically be subject to a warranty and, in some cases, may be reversed without reason in a certain timeframe if the purchaser would like to cancel.
    However, even if the original shipment made to you was in compliance with HazMat requirements, the average customer is not able to prepare a return shipment that is in full compliance with the applicable dangerous goods regulations.
    Making things worse, the shipping of Lithium batteries presumed, suspected, or known to be defective is entirely forbidden by air, and in other modes depends on complicated arrangements, depending on the mode of transport.
    One of the few regulatory authorities that has recognized this issue and taken a proactive action is the U.S. PHMSA, which published an ANPRM (advanced notice of proposed rulemaking) on July 5th (Docket number PHMSA-2011-0143 [HM-253]) in the Federal Register.

    Let us assume you wake up and realize that you’ve overslept because your new iPhone is dead, and remains dead even after being connected to a charger.
    That is not just an issue with your boss when you report to work late; it’s also a regulatory issue, since iPhone batteries (together with an increasing number of other phones) can no longer be uninstalled by the consumer, at least not without losing warranty coverage.
    Since you won’t be able to tell whether the battery is the issue or not, you can’t actually ship the phone back to repair at all, although your rights as a consumer clearly give you warranty coverage. Dropping the phone off in the next store will not help, since it must get to its repair location from there.
    Obviously, reverse logistics solutions are found where there is increased pressure from regulators for compliancy; in the UK, Apple holds a governmental exemption to domestically ship phones with presumably defective batteries by ground transport.
    Although similar issues exist in other markets, without the pressure from regulators, progress will not happen. Apple hasn’t filed any applications in Germany, for example.
    Interesting enough, some logistic providers seem to care little to none about compliance with the dangerous goods-related requirements and actually receive praise for strictly non-compliant products.

    German logistics giant Deutsche Post World Net was commended by the German authorities for help in recycling certain electronic products and minimizing waste.
    DP's “Electroreturn” product also offers consumers free shipping of consumer gadgets (including cellphones) to a recycling facility.
    However, when a representative from DPWN/DHL questioned a German government delegate at the Lithium Battery Symposium February 2013 in Frankfurt, asking if this “Electroreturn” product could be brought in compliance with existing regulatory requirements for transport by mail, the answer by Ms. Gundula Schwan from the German Ministry for Transport was bold and clear:
“Not at all.”
     At that time, any transport of damaged Lithium batteries in any mode of transport within Europe was possible only by means of a special permit issued by the relevant governmental authorities. In the meantime, Special Provision 661 implemented in the 2013 ADR has provided some further options for road transport (although still requiring a special permit) and Multilateral Agreement 259 ADR, which went into force July 15th, 2013, provides even more convenient options within the signatory states of this multilateral agreement. However, the transport of damaged batteries in the mail, and particularly within the air mail, is a no-go.
    Still, the product continues to be offered, and almost every single issue of German logistics-focused newspapers is touting DHL/DPWN’s achievement in providing “unique logistic solutions in the B to C and reverse logistic sector.”

    In a very simplified manner, Lithium-metal batteries and Lithium-ion batteries are divided in the so-called ‘Excepted’ type (metal cells with 1g or less of lithium, or metal batteries with 2g or less of lithium, and Lithium-ion cells with 20 Watt-hours or less and Lithium-ion Batteries with 100 Wh or less); and the “fully regulated types,” which exceed the aforementioned thresholds and are subject to all requirements of the Dangerous Goods Regulations.
    The ‘Excepted’ battery types, shipped in certain quantities, do not require a formal transport document (the “Shipper’s declaration for Dangerous Goods”) or class 9 hazard label and, most notably, shippers who only ship these ‘acceptable’ battery types are—owing to lobbying actions by PRBA—not subject to the otherwise stringent dangerous goods training requirements for the air transport mode.
    Note that the exceptions apply on the package level, so packing hundreds or thousands of packages in one ULD is in compliance, even by means of Shipper-built units (called BUP in short), and these packages of ‘excepted’ batteries will not even show on the Dangerous Goods information presented to the flight commander, the NOTOC (or NOPIC, in the U.S.).
    Matters are not helped by numerous further exemptions provided in the relevant “packing Instructions 965 to 970,” such as button cells of the excepted type installed in equipment not subject to the requirement to apply a handling label and the prescribed text on the Air Waybill.     Also, equipment which contains four or less cells or two or less batteries of the excepted type does not require anything, although it is subject to accident and incident reporting requirements, where such accident or incident occurs.
    The biggest threat—that much is agreed upon between all stakeholders, including the industry lobby group, the PRBA—is twofold:
    First, the shipping of untested batteries: batteries manufactured as cheap clones of brand batteries, but which have never undergone the required testing and quality management procedures.
    It must be clearly said that this is not an issue with OEM or third party batteries—most of the world’s batteries come from Asia, particularly from the plants in the Pearl River delta, and this goes for both “legal” and “illegal” batteries.
    Second, the shipping of batteries—tested or not, of the ‘excepted’ type or fully regulated dangerous goods in class 9—as undeclared, thus hidden, DG.
    The exceptions provided within Packing Instructions 965 to 970 do save the shipping industry considerable money, but only at the expense of operator and Ground Handling Agency frontline staff, who will have to make an assessment whether equipment offered as general cargo and known or presumed to contain batteries is subject to certain exceptions, and thus is not required to bear any indicator pointing to the batteries contained, or if it is simply an undeclared Dangerous Good.

    Neither IATA nor the ICAO Dangerous Goods panel seem to be able to close this gap of whether or how to question the nature of each consignment and ascertain it’s non-dangerous nature, where a general description befitting both types of cargo has been used.
    Some of the provisions made within the ICAO “Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air” or the IATA “Dangerous Goods Regulations” must be called incomplete at best and misleading at worst.
    There are provisions made for so-called “active devices” such as temperature loggers, which are used to record the temperature throughout transport for certain perishable goods like pharmaceuticals:
    “Devices such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, watches and temperature loggers, which are not capable of generating a dangerous evolution of heat, may be transported when intentionally active. When active, these devices must meet defined standards for electromagnetic radiation to ensure that the operation of the device does not interfere with aircraft systems.”
    What are these “defined standards?” The manuals don’t say. So how is the shipper supposed to know?
    For any transport to, from, or through Europe, such “active equipment” must have been demonstrated to conform with the electromagnetic radiation testing requirements of EC Directive 2004/108/EC; and to, from, or through the U.S. with the FAA certification requirements applicable to such devices.
    However, such (mostly) small gadgets would otherwise fall under the aforementioned exemptions (no Lithium battery handling label, no indication on the AWB) which is the position of IATA, but not of some regulators.
    The German LuftEBV - Verordnung zur Regelung des Betriebs von nicht als Luftfahrtgerät zugelassenen elektronischen Geräten in Luftfahrzeugen, or “Directive for the regulation of electronic devices aboard aircraft which have not been certified under airworthiness standards” clearly requires that the pilot in command is informed about the presence of such active devices, something unbeknownst to most shippers and forwarders.
    On the other side, the confusion caused by unclear language and contradicting statements has caught up with the regulators as well.
    Neither the ICAO Technical Instruction nor the IATA DGR require that the number of packages with ‘accepted’ batteries be indicated on the air waybill, where such packages are required to bear the Lithium battery handling label.
    However, it would be most prudent to do so, which is why the German watchdog LBA has informed the major operators and GHAs in Germany in a circular dating May 6th , 2013, that either the number of packages with ‘accepted’ Lithium batteries be shown on the AWB, or else the entire consignment is to be rejected.
    This, however, upset many foreign shippers—namely Dutch—whose cargo was left behind in FRA for this reason, because this requirement was neither contained within the ICAO TI nor the IATA DGR, nor was it mandated by means of a state variation.
    A source close to the matter within the Dutch government called this move “questionable” and expressed the opinion that unilateral moves such as this do not fit into the regulatory structures of a harmonized Europe. “Instead,” the source went on to say, “LBA should have taken this proposal to the ICAO DG Panel in the long run and filed a state variation for immediate implementation of this measure. This would have put all shippers and forwarders on equal footing, since especially Frankfurt as a major transit hub has a multitude of shipments not originating from Germany.”
    For the time being, operator variations related to banning Lithium batteries partially or in total or implementing additional measures are sprouting up like garden weeds in May, which seems to indicate that not all IATA member airlines want to follow ICAO’s and IATA’s position of shipper-friendly leniency.

    The “Freighter Airplane Cargo Fire Risk, Benefit and Cost Model” study jointly undertaken by U.S. FAA, Transport Canada, and UK CAA predicts that, if no mitigation action is taken, in the period 2012 until 2021 there will be approximately 6 accidents, ranging from 2 to 12, at 95 percent confidence interval. The accident costs are estimated to average approximately USD$50 million per annum between 2012 and 2026. PRBA, on the other side, has called that study “fundamentally flawed” without being able to challenge the data outlined in the report.

Note from the Editor: “Dangerous Goods” is the international term used by ICAO and IATA, while for the U.S. the term “Hazardous Materials” is used throughout 49 CFR and related regulatory guidance from FAA and PHMSA. The legal source for the international transport of dangerous goods by air are the “Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air” published biennially by the International Civil Aviation Organization. In practice, however, the “Dangerous Goods Regulations” of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) are typically used; the IATA DGR is in full compliance with the ICAO TI but implements further requirements for operational reasons.
For the purpose of shipping to, from, and through the U.S. by air as well as shipping aboard U.S.-registered aircraft, both manuals may only be used as limited through §§ 171.22, 171.23, 171.24 and 171.26 in 49 CFR.
Jens/Geoffrey