DAWB Doing Away With Bureaucracy?
     Not really!
     Geoffrey called me a few days ago to talk about the Direct Air Waybill issue. He said he had read something on the internet that he thought was interesting and wanted to talk about it with me, considering I had been following airfreight issues in the past.
     Perhaps our readers will be interested to read some of the points of our discussion. Neither of us has a vested interest in this affair, and both are not “experts” in the true meaning of the word, but we both have keen interest in Air Cargo. This must be seen just as a dinner table conversation and means that nobody should overestimate our opinions or think about using them in their practice. They should seek appropriate legal advice instead, if required by their business transactions. 
     Geoffrey said, if my memory holds, more or less what follows: “Since July 1st 2026, changes to the IATA Direct Air Waybill (DAWB) rules started reallocating the legal responsibilities of the parties when something unanticipated happens. Depending on your role, the liabilities are no longer certain as they appeared to be. IATA, the airlines’ private, non-governmental international trade association incorporated under Canadian federal law, in their latest announcement exposed a grey area. If a declaration is made with insufficient accuracy, who does the airline take it up with? The shipper named on the document (not the freight forwarder) could be a company the airline has never assessed, maybe there are problems with jurisdiction, maybe it is an empty box, or just an entity unable to pay in case of aggravations. The 2026 amendment, adopted in March, added a new layer to several IATA resolutions connected with the IATA Cargo Agency programme. In this new framework, if a forwarder uses the DAWB structure with its customer shown as shipper, the airline and forwarder are now expected to agree directly on the terms and indemnities that apply in this case. If there is no bilateral agreement in place, the default automatically applies: the forwarder is treated as if it shipped the goods in its own name. In other words, the forwarder can be deemed to be the shipper under the airline’s conditions of carriage, even if it does not own the cargo and did not pack it. That can translate into forwarders being responsible for cargo information accuracy, charges, dangerous goods compliance, customs declarations, sanctions screening, security screening, etc.”
     Now, there are several points here that I believe need to be digested a bit more . . . The airline generally works in an international environment and it is difficult to think of somebody better placed and equipped than airlines to adapt, and move at ease in faraway environments. It is a bit difficult to believe that an airline serving a certain commercial area has no way of vetting the company tendered by the forwarder; no airline executive wakes up in the morning to decide where he or she wants to fly the aircraft the following day. The naivety that Geoffrey seems to understand from IATA’s words does not exist. In its turn, the forwarder does not huddle a pack of stray shippers, putting together dangerous goods without understanding the nature of the business . . . Obviously there are and there have always been risks, and there are bad shippers and bad forwarders, but that is not frequent. In general, forwarders are a group of scrupulous and professional people doing a fine job: pushing cargo through the supply chain despite all the problems, difficulties, bureaucracy, shortcomings and disappointments, even when these originate from rolled shipments or short or split loadings. Forwarders are also in general trustworthy parties, so much so that they seem to be the perfect target for governments, or SC stakeholders to add layer after layer of accountability, because FF’s seem to be such an easy target for any kind of safety and security measure.
     In the airlines’ case, as forwarders are obliged to lodge, at their own cost, expensive guarantees intended to secure airlines’ revenues, they almost automatically become the easy aim of measures taken to protect airlines’ payments and liabilities. Furthermore, since 9/11 there is almost nothing that can get into the aircraft without a complete examination of what it is, where does it come from and what is it used for . . . This notwithstanding, the heavy vetting that air cargo is routinely subject to seems to be insufficient from this other perspective, why?
     On the other hand, I am arguing that the DAWB legal framework is not so different in practice from the natural choice that forwarders have to make in their other businesses on the road, rail and maritime: they can operate as principals or as agents, thus getting duties and benefits commensurate to their choice.  For deep-rooted habits and usual mores, this has not been exactly the same in air cargo, for several decades, and even with the DAWB arrangement it is not corresponding 100%.  Airlines and forwarders have had the habit of pushing the limits of contractual provisions to their legal limits for time immemorial, so there is no big surprise now. The one thing that is surprising instead is that the new framework has been adopted without the usual framework agreement that for decades has ensured the movement of air cargo all over the world, i.e. the IATA/FIATA Cargo Conference. The dialogue has seldom been a bed of roses, but it has produced significant results for a long, long lime in setting air cargo rules that work in practice, for example the most advanced instrument to date, and now defunct, European Agency Cargo Programme.       
     Brandon Fried, AfA executive director, has taken an almost completely different view: "Freight forwarders should not be expected to assume liability for cargo they neither own, pack, nor control. The revised framework risks shifting responsibility away from the party creating and controlling the risk and onto an intermediary whose role has not fundamentally changed, creating potentially significant legal, operational, and insurance consequences for freight forwarders. Businesses should not assume their existing cover will automatically respond if contractual liability changes. Smaller and medium sized freight forwarders, in particular, should carefully review both their contractual position and insurance arrangements before accepting shipments under the revised framework.”
     This has been a very hot topic of discussion within FIATA’s AFI, at the time when the late Herman Donker was the real dealmaker in this business. I wonder what he would say today. I miss his sharp and clear words so much . . . Few experts have done more than Herman for Air Cargo, may his soul rest in peace.  
     Having paid a small, but well deserved tribute to Herman, here comes the second part of Geoffrey’s reasoning, in substance echoing Brandon’s argument: “The controversial part is that some of this depends on what’s actually inside the box and what the underlying transaction means. We can only wonder how is a forwarder supposed to guarantee the absence of dangerous goods if they never touched the packing?” My instinct suggests an elementary question: why did we spend the last twenty years or so devising more and more sophisticated security measures? These are aimed at ensuring ‘legitimate trade’ is moving in ‘secured’ packages that no freight forwarder has actually touched, unless commanded to do so by the authorities? Are we now unable to give these hard-won measures sufficient credit for doing what they are supposed to do, i.e. provide a reasonable layer of security when the cargo is loaded onto the aircraft? I even have an additional question: are we now much worse off than how we were ten or twenty years ago?
     Geoffrey also argued that this change could make forwarders responsible for things they cannot reliably verify. So in practice this could push them to demand more declarations, more paperwork, more indemnities, and probably more fees to cover the risk. Shippers under the new scenario will start seeing tougher contract terms from forwarders: stronger indemnity clauses, stricter information assurances, maybe refusal to move higher-risk commodities without additional inspections. Honestly, this seems almost an accurate description of what has happened in the industry for at least the last three decades . . . so I see no reason to cry wolf now.  The reliable and responsible shipper will not feel any additional friction in my view, save for the increased level of bureaucracy, as and if airlines really feel too insecure now as opposed to ten or twenty years ago to embrace novel requirements.
     Geoffrey insists: “Airlines could benefit from this new arrangement because they can easily resort to the forwarder they already have a commercial relationship with, instead of trying to pursue a relatively unknown shipper.” Again I am not surprised: IATA, and all the represented airlines behind its flag, have always tried to control the forwarders’ multitude through a series of rules that IATA sets in its role to “represent, lead and serve” the airlines. The various cargo programmes, and CASS are powerful instruments that achieve the goal of keeping forwarders within IATA’s strict rules, with few, negligible exceptions. Whether this is good for competition and competitiveness, it is a very complex topic that is outside of today’s focus, and better minds than ours have discussed for decades. One should never forget what air cargo was before Ronald Reagan took office, but that is so long ago that only few of us today remember that time. 
     Now we come to the point I had left behind. One could actually argue whether aircraft are facing greater risks today than in the past, as this seems not to be today’s reality. If you investigate this topic a bit more, albeit through the unreasonable paucity of reliable data, the reality seems to be different. According to Airbus fatalities are concentrated in two phases of the flight and these seem to have no connection with the cargo loaded. META elaborated another hypothesis that I personally do not consider particularly relevant today: “Unlike passenger aviation—where accidents are heavily dominated by controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) or loss of control due to weather—the cargo registry highlights a specific recurring mechanical/human factor: shifting or poorly secured cargo.” I am reporting this as it emerged from my brief research, but I think this result takes into account historical elements that today are no longer relevant. I read a much more interesting point raised by Wikipedia instead: “The registry data reveals that regional, shorter-haul aircraft suffer significantly higher accident rates than long-haul jet cargo giants. In typical multi-year spans, turboprop cargo hulls suffer more than double the accident rates of jet cargo aircraft, often due to operating in regions with less robust radar and ground infrastructure.” In many areas of the world (e.g. Europe) there is a lot of trucking involved in air cargo, but that does not diminish the interest of the statement. In any case none of these points pertain to the forwarder’s services. Considering these elements, could the purpose of the DWAB rule have been generated by the pursuit of greater peace of mind for the airline, rather than greater security for the aircraft? It is certainly difficult to answer this question that is nonetheless intriguing . . .  
     At this point, Geoffrey turned his attention to FIATA, as the worldwide representative organisation of the forwarders. FIATA formally asked for a review and even tried to delay the effective date to October 2026, but as of late July nothing had changed. Allegedly some airlines might not implement the measure right away, or maybe not for all customers. So forwarders might have to treat this as a carrier-by-carrier visitation, talking to each airline to confirm the applicable conditions before they tender their cargo for carriage. In my opinion, for IATA this looks like giving up on its own mission, which includes setting the standards for the entire industry. This is probably regrettable and shows that IATA’s persuasive force is not so solid when the airlines are directly involved. Hence, if you are a forwarder you should get in writing from each airline you work with, whether it is applying the revised rule and what terms to expect, then reverberate these conditions on to your unwilling customer, in order to seek additional protection and then, after all that, probably ditch your usual insurance policy and take out new insurance, if you find it.  Please bear with my irony here, but I have the impression that something went missing before giving a ‘GO’.
     Case in point, the European Shippers’ Council notes that “adding to the uncertainty, IATA has advised freight forwarders to engage directly with individual airlines to determine which contractual terms will apply. Rather than providing a single industry-wide approach, airlines may implement the revised framework differently, meaning forwarders operating across multiple carrier networks could find themselves working under different liability regimes depending on the airline used.” This is all pretty awkward, yet nobody seems to put on the table the question of the rule being adequate and proportionate. Should there be no proportion between what you are doing and the requirements on the public and the consequences within the industry? Why is IATA not subject to an appropriate impact assessment, considering it is issuing rules that nearly bear the force of law, even if, technically speaking, they are not?
     So let us come back for one moment to the safety issue: if airlines are not at greater risk in July 2026 than they were in July 2016 or 2006 or earlier still, why was this consequential change necessary? This is not a slight difference of hue on the wall of your bathroom, it is a big change that entails big adjustments in the industry and enormous, rippling costs for the entire supply chain. Considering these stakes, I asked AI to review IATA’s Safety Reports, issued since 1964, with a view to ascertaining the possible increased risk and this is the result (beware that AI always tells you that it can make mistakes):
     Cargo aircraft accidents have declined significantly over the long term, mirroring the broader historical trajectory of commercial aviation safety. The downward trend is visible when analysing several key metrics tracked by safety organisations:
     1. Long-Term Historical Decline
Over a multi-decade timeline, accident rates for both passenger and cargo carriers have dropped sharply due to generational advancements in jet technology, enhanced cockpit resource management, and strict international standardizations. For instance, data tracked by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) shows that the fatal accident rate for U.S. air carriers plummeted by roughly 80% when comparing recent decades to the late 20th century.
     2. The Accident-to-Flight Volume Ratio
While the total volume of global air cargo flights has grown exponentially since the 1960s, the rate of accidents per million flight hours or departures has reliably decreased. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the global all-accident rate for commercial operations dropped from one accident per 456,000 flights a decade ago to approximately one accident per 760,000–810,000 flights by 2025/2026.
     3. Current Cargo Vulnerabilities
Despite the overall decline, cargo aircraft accidents have dropped at a slightly slower rate than passenger aircraft accidents. Cargo operations still see higher risk variables due to:

• Older Fleets: Cargo operators frequently utilise converted, older-generation passenger aircraft.
• Night Flying: Cargo routes heavily operate during overnight windows, increasing human fatigue factors.
• Payload Risks: Challenges uniquely tied to loading, balance, and the transport of hazardous materials (such as lithium-ion batteries).

     Because of these factors, hull loss percentages for cargo aircraft have remained flat in recent rolling averages—meaning that while flying is safer overall, cargo planes continue to comprise a disproportionately large slice (25% to 30%) of the few accidents that do occur.
     So we have two elements on the table: airlines are not at greater risk today, but the track record of air cargo is not improving as fast as the passengers’ side. In other words, if you merely look at the numbers, air cargo seems to be doing better in terms for safety, but not sufficiently to match the passengers’ side vast improvement. There has been only one case in which cargo has matched, and possibly even surpassed, passengers’ standards and that was during the pandemic. Otherwise, passengers and cargo are intimately connected, but also completely different from many points of view: passengers are not, and they will never be “self-loaded cargo”, as I heard in Brussels many years ago.
     The IATA move is allegedly supposed to reduce ambiguity, but as we discussed it could increase the complexity of negotiations, the number of contractual prescriptions and legal reviews, thus increasing uncertainty, paperwork and the overall workload for the parties involved, including the airlines. This will probably become the new normal, but adapting to this new approach is neither easy nor cheap.
     The ‘safest move’ as somebody dear to us said “is to confirm your position before the next shipment becomes your next test case.” This is what I consider a decent aphorism describing the risk, as well as a powerful shot: the Queen’s move on the Air Cargo wonderful chessboard . . . or could it be a Bongcloud Opening with unpredictable consequences? For sure a few decades of negotiations and habits have been discontinued.
     As Lewis Carroll’s White Queen screams in pain before pinning her finger with a brooch, she explains how her movement affects her timeline: "It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backward.” From here viewpoint, looking at the wonderful chessboard Alice exclaimed: “It’s a great huge game of chess that’s being played—all over the world—if this is the world at all, you know. Oh, what fun it is! How I wish I was one of them! I wouldn’t mind being a Pawn, if only I might join—though of course I should like to be a Queen, best."  But the Red Queen declared: "Now, here you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!"
     We hope you enjoyed this meandering, and probably pointless debate. In running backwards as fast as I could, I think I did my part.
Marco Sorgetti/Geoffrey Arend